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In 2013–2014, the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (HUN MoD) engaged in its 
first structured strategic Foresight process, a process designed to examine events that 
might affect Hungary until 2030. While it achieved success, the process also had 
shortcomings. Namely, the Strategic Analysis Group accurately predicted two events, 
Russia’s use of military force and the migration crisis worsening, yet they neither foresaw 
how fast Russian aggression would result in military conflict nor did they believe in their 
findings enough to appropriately prepare for the migration crisis. This thesis introduces 
the evolution and main concepts of Futures Studies and Foresight. It describes the 
Hungarian Strategic Foresight process and results, explains how the Hungarian experts 
contemplated the crises before they started, and compares their considerations to the 
actual events. It also uses the diagnostic tools inherent in Voros’s generic Foresight 
framework to analyze the HUN MoD’s Strategic Foresight process, confirming those 
findings with Popper’s methods categories. The thesis concludes that the Foresight 
process had relevant flaws caused by being unprepared regarding Foresight methodology 
and also by being intelligence-focused rather than leaving room for alternative future 
possibilities and out-of-the-box thinking. The thesis recommends improving Strategic 
Foresight methodology, building Foresight capacity, and raising awareness about the 
relationship between intelligence and Foresight work in the HUN MoD. 
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The past is the beginning of the beginning and all that is and has been is  
but the twilight of the dawn. 
—H.G. Wells  
 
From 2013–2014, during a strategic analysis and evaluation process at the 
Hungarian Ministry of Defense (HUN MoD), experts utilized a strategic Foresight 
analytical framework to identify potential threats for the period of 2015–2030.1 Among 
other things, they accurately predicted the current European migration crisis and a more 
aggressive Russian foreign and security policy. However, it seems they were neither 
specific enough regarding the time frame of these potentials nor did they believe strongly 
enough in their findings. For instance, the HUN MoD experts conjectured that Russia 
might be aggressive on the scale currently true around 2020 at the earliest. In addition, 
although their final strategic Foresight report stated explicitly that a migration crisis in 
Europe might evolve due to the wars in the Middle East, the experts did not believe that it 
would really happen. So, even though experts were aware of the trends and drew 
appropriate conclusions, they did not predict the timing of the events nor did they expect 
that some of their findings would really come true. In reality, both increased Russian 
aggression and widespread migration, which the experts identified within their research, 
have had substantial effects on Hungary. 
These phenomena raise several questions. This thesis attempts to answer at least 
one core question so that improvements can be adopted. Why did the experts of the HUN 
MoD—including the author of this thesis—not take their conclusions seriously enough to 
foresee that their findings not only would happen, but would happen within a very short 
period of time? In order to address the core question, the research here analyzes the HUN 
MoD’s strategic Foresight process with the help of well-known Foresight frameworks 
provided by the literature. Once possible answers are found, it is worth asking further 
                                                 
1 The author of the thesis took part in the 2013–2014 Foresight process of the HUN MoD. Much of the 
information in the thesis is from his experience and observations. 
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questions: how did the process itself affect the outcome, and what kind of organizational 
dynamics could better enable Foresight work in the future?  
Accordingly, now that the thesis has introduced the need for improvements in 
Hungarian Foresight analysis, Chapter II will introduce and explore the concept of 
strategic Foresight. Chapter III goes on to describe the process and method of strategic 
Foresight at the HUN MoD during 2013–2014, highlighting some of the conclusions 
drawn from the Foresight process. Chapter IV then examines how, why, and in what 
ways the experts of the HUN MoD considered the possibilities of Russian military 
interventions and a European migration crisis before these events started. The fourth 
chapter continues with an examination of the actual events and introduces their impacts 
on their Hungarian Defense Force (HDF). Having introduced Foresight and examined the 
HUN MoD’s process as well as the relationship between that process and events, as well 
as effects on the HDF, Chapter V then utilizes the diagnostic tools from Joseph Voros’s 
Foresight framework and Rafael Popper’s Foresight methods categories to analyze the 
HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight process. The thesis then concludes with Chapter VI, 
which gives recommendations based on the research. 
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II. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT  
Although many definitions and interpretations of strategic Foresight exist, we can 
define Strategic Foresight as, essentially, the methods by which organizations come to 
identify and predict possible events that may effect the environment in which they 
operate so that they can both mitigate risks and exploit opportunities. Strategic Foresight 
is only one form of Foresight, and Foresight is only one aspect of Futures Studies. To 
clarify what strategic Foresight is and what it is not, Chapter Two first describes Futures 
Studies and introduces the role and place of Foresight within the domain of Futures 
Studies, then further describes Foresight in general as well as understandings regarding 
strategic Foresight in particular. 
A. FUTURES STUDIES 
Before World War II, predicting the future was largely a matter of mysticism 
rather than science. While people have likely been trying to predict the future as long as 
they’ve been around, in his 2011 article “Evolution of Futures Studies,” Tuoma Kuosa 
observes that no scientific approaches for studying the future seem to have existed before 
the 1940s–1950s.2 Instead, Kuosa explains, people that wanted to know what the future 
might hold were likely to rely on supernatural beliefs and mysticism; professionals like 
oracles or fortune-tellers communicated very deterministic future outcomes using various 
methods like Tarot card reading, psychic seeing, crystal ball reading, astronomy, or 
varying interpretations of Nostradamus’s predictions, all still popular today. 
According to Kuosa, in the 1940s and 1950s, many economic, social, and 
scientific phenomena emerged that increased the demand for a better understanding of the 
future, and Foresight emerged especially into military thought.3 Among other 
phenomena, globalization, industrialization, and urbanization all reached new heights; 
space travel, usage of nuclear technology, and development of information technology all 
began. Kuosa also pointed out that in this rapidly changing environment, management 
                                                 
2 Tuomo Kuosa, “Evolution of Futures Studies,” Futures 43, no. 3 (2011): 329. 
3 Ibid., 332. 
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thinking prospered (see Figure 1), and more and more actors realized that they needed a 
solid foundation and method for long-term planning. At the same time, new methods 
were developed and certain methods matured (including trend-extrapolations, 
technological Foresight, and game-theory), and various actors began to apply these 
methods for making predictions and forecasting.4 The RAND Corporation also created 
innovative approaches for developing military strategies and understanding new military 
technologies better.5 Probably, the most important development during and directly after 
World War II regarding Foresight was the emergence of scenario planning. First, Herman 
Kahn used scenario planning for studying how the Soviet Union and the United States 
could use nuclear weapons against each other.6 Kahn was well-recognized for further 
developing the method, to the point that Scientific American magazine characterized 
Kahn as “thinking the unthinkable,” and, Stanley Kubrick used Kahn “as the model for 
Dr. Strangelove in the classic film.”7 
In the 1960s and 1970s, future research began to spread further outside the 
military. Researchers started to study the long-term effects of phenomena like energy 
consumption, population growth, environmental issues, economic development, and even 
social movements.8 During this period two particular scientific concepts, system thinking 
and futurology, emerged and became highly influential.9 Published in 1966, History and 
Futurology by Ossip Flechtheim was maybe the most relevant piece in Futures studies 
and suggested, among other things, that futurology should solve the problems of 
humanity to avoid catastrophes, wars, oppression, and poverty.10 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 332. 
5 Tuomo Kuosa, The Evolution of Strategic Foresight: Navigating Public Policy Making (Farnham, 
Surrey: Gower, 2012), 6. 
6 Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).  
7 Rich Horwath, Scenario Planning: No Crystal Ball Required (Chicago: Strategic Thinking Institute, 
2006), 1.  
8 Kuosa, “Evolution of Futures Studies,” 331. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ossip Kurt Flechtheim, History and Futurology (Meisenheim Am Glan: Hain, 1966).  
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Figure 1.  Evolution of Future Studies and Foresight Domain.11 
Interestingly, even though dialectic thinking and especially strategic management 
became more and more prevalent in the 1980s, heavily impacting Future Studies, there 
has not been as much methods development in the last 30 years. According to Kuosa, 
developing strategic management concepts created the opportunity for Foresight to have 
a more significant role again in Futures Studies.12 However, Kuosa highlights that, while 
the 80% of the Futures Studies methods were created in the first 30 years (1950–1980), 
only 20% of the methods have been developed in the next 30 years (1980–2010).13 Kuosa 
points out that new methods regarding future research have barely emerged since the 
1980s,14 so that it is possible that the methods of Future Studies themselves deserve a 
revamp. 
                                                 
11 Kuosa, The Evolution of Strategic Foresight, 25. 





Figure 2.  The Scale of Five Classes of Future Domain.15  
As Figure 1 demonstrates, many approaches exist for studying the future, and 
researchers then looked for ways to categorize the approaches. Tuomo Kuosa categorized 
the different approaches into five classes and put them onto a scale that shows how 
deterministic/un-deterministic and active/passive each of the classes are in relation to 
each other (see Figure 2).16 According to Kuosa, the first category of future approaches is 
“foretelling and prophesy,” which is the most deterministic and passive approach and 
does not have any scientific basis at all and would include a fortune-teller telling the 
future from a crystal ball.17 “Predicting,” Kuosa’s second category, happens, for 
example, when meteorologists and statisticians use very strong causalities “to predict 
                                                 
15 Tuomo Kuosa, Towards Strategic Intelligence: Foresight, Intelligence, and Policy-making (Vantaa: 




events with nearly 100% certainty.”18 “Forecasting,” Kuosa’s third category, involves 
exploiting and study past data by modeling and econometric techniques including trend 
curves and trend extrapolations, among others; the kind of extrapolation of past data that 
happens when, for example, demographers try to forecast demographic data for the future 
or economists forecast the GDP growth of a country for next year.19 Kuosa explains that 
one of the main differences between forecasting and prediction is that forecasting 
provides estimations of probabilities while prediction does not.20 
At a higher level of “pro-activity,” “visionary,” and “un-deterministic” level on 
the scale, “Foresight” is Kuosa’s fourth category. The so-called FOREN report, 
considered the official EU guidance for Foresight analysis, defines Foresight as: 
a systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium-to-
long-term vision-building process aimed at present day decisions and 
mobilizing joint actions. Foresight arises from a convergence of trends 
underlying recent developments in the fields of “policy analysis”, 
“strategic planning” and ”future studies”. It brings together key agents of 
change and various sources of knowledge in order to develop strategic 
visions and anticipatory intelligence.21 
Accordingly, while the starting point of Foresight is similar to forecasting, as it 
also studies trends, Foresight attempts to gain a deeper and more holistic understanding 
of the future. The process of Foresight often involves several actors and also provides 
alternatives rather than only one single forecast.22 Kuosa’s fifth category is Futures 
Studies, which has a similar methodology as Foresight but is even more visionary and 
pro-active as it “attempts to vision a better world and make a change towards it.”23 
                                                 
18 The weather for the next day, for instance. 
19 Kuosa, Towards Strategic Intelligence, 31. 
20 Ibid. 
21 François Farhi, James P. Gavigan, and Michael Keenan. A Practical Guide to Regional Foresight 
(Brussels: FOREN, Foresight for Regional Development Network, 2001), v.  




Currently, Foresight is understood as a systematic process, where the participants 
of the process intend to understand future probabilities in a holistic and grounded way. 
Because it is actually impossible to entirely predict the future, Foresight lays emphasis on 
creating alternative scenarios, providing “some probabilities beyond linear predictions 
[that] can be attributed to emerging social phenomena.”24 However, practitioners of 
Foresight insist that the roots of future exist in the present, thus certain present variables 
have to be studied in a systematic way to get a better understanding about possible 
futures and future possibilities.25 
Foresight rose as a utilized methodology in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, 
thanks in large part to the growing understanding of the importance of and clarity 
regarding strategic thinking. While, as mentioned earlier, the origins of Foresight date 
back to pre-WWII, Foresight was not used as a method very often until the 1980s, while 
forecasting and future studies dominated the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s, Foresight 
gained prevalence thanks to Mintzberg, who made a distinction between strategic 
thinking and strategic planning,26 a conceptual innovation that also triggered new ideas 
concerning Foresight. According to Mintzberg, while strategic planning is a formalized, 
analytical process that breaks down a goal into steps, “strategic thinking, in contrast[,] is 
about synthesis. It involves intuition and creativity. The outcome of strategic thinking is 
an integrated perspective of the enterprise, a not-too-precisely articulated vision of 
direction.”27 Taking Mintzberg’s concept into consideration, Joseph Voros then argued 
that Foresight was “an aspect of strategic thinking,” as it focuses on exploring the future 
and developing options but does not cover the implementation of actions.28 According to 
Voros’s understanding, the process of creating a strategy is a series of consecutive, 
interdependent steps where strategic thinking is the first one. Thus, for him strategy 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 32–33. 
26 Henry Mintzberg. “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,” Harvard Business Review 72, no. 1 
(January/February 1994): 107–114.  
27 Ibid., 108. 
28 Joseph Voros. “A Generic Foresight Process Framework,” Foresight 5, no. 3 (2003): 13. 
 9
making comes as the second step, where decisions are made about strategic goals based 
on the information gathered from strategic thinking, and the last step is implementing 
actions. So, according to Voros, Foresight is one aspect of strategic thinking which 
provides input to the next step, strategy making, with the idea that implementation will 
follow.29 
 
Figure 3.  Voros’s Generic Foresight Framework.30  
By using Mintzberg’s concepts and the results of previous Foresight studies, 
Voros developed a widely cited and accepted generic Foresight framework.31 As depicted 
in Figure 3, Voros’ Foresight framework has several phases, and researchers have to 
attempt to answer particular questions during each of the phases, utilizing different 
methodologies. Voros’s framework can be summarized as follows: 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 14. 
31 Ibid., 14–16. 
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1. Inputs: There is no question in this phase. Here the analysts gather 
information in order to understand the environment in which they operate.  
2. Foresight: The overall step of Foresight has three consecutive sub-steps. 
 Analysis: What seems to be happening? 
 Interpretation: What is really happening? 
 Prospection: What might happen? 
3. Outputs: What might we need to do? 
4. Strategy: What and how will we do?32 
C. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT 
Voros’s generic framework outlines only the main form of Foresight, and 
Foresight per se is a broad category that contains sub-categories based on the type of 
methods used, one of which—and possibly the most useful of the three—is strategic 
Foresight. Among others, Kuosa distinguishes three Foresight actions: the participatory, 
deskwork, and strategic categories of Foresight:  
 Participatory Foresight applies “broad stakeholder involvement and 
empowerment in a desired futures visioning, anticipation and co-
designing process;” its main aim is to help to avoid 
misunderstandings and promote communication to achieve a 
“deeper mutual understanding” of the future between certain 
people.33 
 Deskwork Foresight is the academic approach to Foresight, where 
scholar(s) conduct research usually without any collaboration with 
practitioners and stakeholders so that scholars can “reveal and 
overcome dogmatism, compulsion, and domination in order to 
attain more rational social institutions and relations.”34 
 Strategic Foresight provides “strategically viable policy 
alternatives” for decision makers either in the public or private 
sector in order to help them “win political, military or economic 
battles.”35 Accordingly, strategic Foresight is always a highly 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 14–16. 
33 Kuosa, Towards Strategic Intelligence, 38. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Kuosa, The Evolution of Strategic Foresight, 12. 
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customer-oriented project that comprises all the elements of 
strategic analysis, usually with an emphasis on long-term issues. 
Strategic Foresight can be either participatory or deskwork and also 
can combine the two.36 
While depth understanding and rational approaches are important, strategic 
Foresight can combine or utilize participatory Foresight and/or deskwork Foresight, and 
strategic Foresight always contains alternatives as well. So, what exactly is strategic 
Foresight again, and why is it useful?  One of the several definitions comes from Richard 
A. Slaughter, who defines strategic Foresight as follows: 
Strategic Foresight is the ability to create and maintain a high-quality, 
coherent and functional forward view, and to use the insights arising in 
useful organisational ways. For example to detect adverse conditions, 
guide policy, shape strategy, and to explore new markets, products and 
services. It represents a fusion of futures methods with those of strategic 
management.37 
Slaughter gives three main reasons for strategic Foresight’s usefulness on an 
organizational level.38 First, strategic Foresight helps organizations to get out from the 
cultural trap of “Western worldview and industrial ideology” during the analyses.39 
Slaughter points out that organizations are usually stuck in “short-term, bottom-line 
thinking” influenced mostly by “mainstream economists” and “conventional empiricists” 
representing the Western worldview.40 Strategic Foresight provides an opportunity for 
organizations to distance themselves from these influences and “grasp some of the major 
‘big picture’ concerns about human purposes, cultural evolution and sustainability.”41 
                                                 
36 Kuosa, Towards Strategic Intelligence, 38. 
37 Richard A. Slaughter, “Future Studies as an Intellectual and Applied Discipline,” in Advancing 
Futures: Futures Studies in Higher Education, ed. by James A. Dator (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 104. 
38 Interestingly, in terms of the usefulness of strategic Foresight no new arguments have emerged for 
the last 15 years. A good example for this is the literature review of the following article: Gloria Appiah 
and David Sarpong. “On the Influence of Organizational Routines on Strategic Foresight,” Foresight 17, 
no. 5 (2015): 514–517. 
39 Slaughter, “Future Studies,” 104. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 104–105. 
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Second, in addition to Foresight’s useful ability to consider big picture concerns 
without undue influence, Slaughter highlights that strategic Foresight offers enormous 
advantages for organizations not only by studying future long-term issues, but also short- 
and medium-term phenomena.42 He suggests that, by using different strategic Foresight 
methods, it is possible to recognize “signals” from the operating environment, which may 
trigger the exploration of new assumptions in organizations. Thus, organizations can start 
to develop alternative responses to newly perceived possible future conditions earlier, 
and, accordingly, their reaction time can be reduced as “near term future ceases to be an 
abstraction.”43 In my understanding, this aspect of Foresight provides the most relevant 
practical benefit for organizations. 
Third, strategic Foresight contributes new ideas in several directions, according to 
Slaughter. Strategic Foresight contributes to managements by providing: “insights into 
new industries, new ways of solving old problems, new sources of impact-free wealth-
creation, [and] the grounds of new business and civil cultures.”44 Slaughter also 
acknowledges that, although these three aspects are highly useful, organizations will not 
be able to foresee everything. However, his core argument stands: that organizations that 
conduct strategic Foresight will have a better chance to exploit opportunities and mitigate 
threats, as they will be able to reduce the uncertainties of the future.45  
Chapter II introduced and explored the different terms regarding Futures Studies, 
specifically Foresight. The chapter pointed out that Foresight is only one form of future 
research, and that it has transformed and developed over the last 60–70 years. Methods 
other than Foresight became prevalent in the 1950s; however, with the increasing need 
for strategic thinking, strategic Foresight could become relevant again, if and when 
strategic management creates the space for the entire Foresight process. Janos Voros 
developed a widely-accepted generic Foresight framework, the one that the thesis will 
utilize in Chapter V  
                                                 
42 Ibid., 105. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 106. 
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First, however, in Chapter III, the thesis examines how strategic Foresight has 
already been utilized at the HUN MoD. Strategic Foresight likely continues to be the 
most practical version of Foresight for the HUN MoD’s needs since, as Chapter II 
demonstrated, Foresight attempts to provide a holistic view about long-term possible 
futures for decision-makers in order to avoid threats and exploit opportunities. 
  
 14
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III. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT  
AT THE HUNGARIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
While Chapter II defined and gave an overview of the usefulness of strategic 
Foresight, Chapter III explores the HUN MoD’s 2013–2014 strategic Foresight process 
and its results. First, Chapter III briefly delineates why and how Hungary’s strategic 
Foresight process was created, then describes the method. The chapter then introduces the 
main results. 
A. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT AT THE HUNGARIAN MINISTRY OF 
DEFENSE BEFORE 2012 
After the fall of communism in 1990, the HUN MoD lacked both the expertise 
and experience to develop appropriate strategic plans. As a member of the Warsaw Pact, 
the Hungarian military had been directly subordinated to the Soviet High Command for 
almost 40 years, thus the HUN MoD did not, nor was it allowed to, formulate its own 
defense policies and plans during the Cold War. Hungary felt those consequences 
throughout most of the 1990s because “two largely incompetent [domestic] groups” were 
facing each other during that time.46 The knowledge of one group, the military officers at 
the HUN MoD, had become obsolete after the Cold War as they had been trained in the 
Soviet system, and the other group, the newly arriving civilians, equally did not possess 
appropriate knowledge of defense.47 Despite these circumstances, the leadership of the 
HUN MoD quickly realized that the Communist-based system would not work anymore, 
and, in the early 1990s, experts of the General Staff began to study Western defense 
planning and management methods. Although the HUN MoD’s defense planning system 
developed steadily for the next 20 years, and strategic guidance became institutionalized, 
HUN MoD strategic analysis overall and strategic Foresight in particular remained weak.  
Some of that weakness likely resulted because, after joining the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999, the HUN MoD leadership intended to adapt 
                                                 
46 Pál Dunay, “The Half-Hearted Transformation of the Hungarian Military,” European Security 14, 
no. 1 (2005): 21.  
47 Ibid. 
 16
NATO requirements on every level including defense policy aspects. HUN MoD 
therefore did not see development of national strategic guidance as a pressing issue. 
Accordingly, in the 2000s, Hungary often accepted NATO defense policy guidelines 
without debate and uncritically followed NATO’s capability development goals,48 
proposed to Hungary by the NATO International Staff via the NATO Defense Planning 
Process. According to my understanding, the uncontested acceptance of NATO defense 
policies happened partially because, as a new NATO member, Hungary wanted to prove 
that it was a reliable ally and partially because the HUN MoD’s organizational culture 
suggested that the MoD had to follow the requests from the center of the Alliance 
(Brussels) as it had had to in the Warsaw Pact (Moscow). Among these circumstances, 
well-defined strategic guidance and independent strategic Foresight did not seem 
important, because strategic guidance came directly from NATO and the HUN MoD had 
“only” to implement it. 
In 2012, the Hungarian government initiated a necessary reform process regarding 
strategic management.49 The reform intended to improve the governmental strategic 
management system by harmonizing and standardizing the development and execution of 
strategic documents in every ministry including the HUN MoD. To accommodate the 
government decree, the HUN MoD executed a huge lessons-learned project concerning 
its strategic management system. The project revealed that strategic Foresight did exist, 
but it was ad hoc and a somewhat neglected activity, neither conducted via a rigorous 
methodology nor organized in a structured way.50 Ad hoc strategic Foresight had resulted 
in discrepancies among HUN MoD departments, as different analytical communities 
within the organization did not necessarily share the same view about the international 
security environment, causing inconsistencies among the different phases of defense 
planning.51 
                                                 
48 They were called Force Goals and later Capability Goals in the NATO Defense Planning Process. 
49 Government Decree No. 38/2012 (III. 12.) on the governmental strategic planning system.  
50 Bence Németh, “A PESTEM és PMESII Stratégiai Elemző Rendszerek összehasonlítása: A 
Honvédelmi Minisztérium új Stratégiai értékelő Rendszere,” Felderítő Szemle 13, no. 1 (2014): 127. 
51 Ibid. 
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B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW FORESIGHT PROCESS AND 
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS GROUP (SAG) 
The task of developing a new Foresight process belonged to the Defense Planning 
Department (DPD), and the DPD decided to develop a sophisticated Foresight 
methodology and involve all intended users into the Foresight process. First, the DPD 
realized that it needed to have a rigorous methodology in order to make the process more 
robust, structured, and reliable.52 Second, all the stakeholders and intended users of the 
products of Foresight (the analytic communities and the General Staff) had to be involved 
in the strategic Foresight process. By involving all users, the Foresight process could 
create synergies by using the unique analytic capabilities of different departments at the 
HUN MoD. In addition, differing views of analysts could be discussed so that any 
emerging conflicts between expert communities could be solved during the strategic 
Foresight analysis process rather than after.53 Furthermore, Foresight could be fine-tuned 
to its users’ needs by involving them in the process from the start.54 
The DPD created two subsequent working groups. First, for the development and 
testing of the Foresight process, a working group was created with experts from the DPD, 
scholars from the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies (Budapest), and analysts from 
the Military National Security Service. The working group developed and tested the 
Foresight methodology between February and July 2013. When the methodology was 
deemed ready, a new working group, the so-called Strategic Analysis Group (SAG), was 
established that included the members of the previous working group. Additionally, 
analysts of the intelligence department of the General Staff (J2), operational planners of 
the General Staff (J3), and experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also invited to 
participate in the Foresight process. While the J2 joined the SAG, the J3 and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs opted for being observers only rather than active participants of the 
process.  
                                                 
52 The author of the thesis worked as a senior strategic analyst at the DPD and the SAG that time, and 
this statement stems from his own observations. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Németh, “A PESTEM és PMESII,” 126–128. 
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With the members in place, the SAG began the analysis process. During the 
summer of 2013, the members of the SAG conducted a literature review analyzing 
dozens of strategic documents and Foresight analyses from all around the world 
(including from OECD, Red Cross, CIA, NATO, UN, as well as strategic documents 
from other nations).55 Additionally, domain-specific experts (including in IT, technology, 
demography, and energy) and also regional-specific external experts were invited from 
both the public and private sectors to give briefings on areas where the SAG felt gaps in 
its knowledge existed.56 The actual analytical work of strategic Foresight began after 
that, in September 2013, and the process was finished in April 2014.  
The HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight methodology was based on an improved 
version of PEST analysis. PEST analysis, first introduced by Francis J. Aguilar in 1967, 
is a macro-environmental analytical tool focusing on Political, Economic, Social, 
Technology (PEST) factors of the environment in which the organization concerned 
operates.57 For the last 50 years, different versions of PEST analysis have emerged, and 
the four original factors have often been complemented by new ones. Probably, the most 
prevalent one is the PESTLE or PESTEL analysis,58 which takes into consideration the 
Legal and Environmental factors of the environment in addition to the original four 
factors. The HUN MoD’S SAG added the Environmental and Military factors to the 
original framework and called their version of PEST analysis PESTEM. HUN MoD 
experts deemed the environmental factor highly important, because they believed that the 
effects of the global climate change would not only affect the operational landscape 
where Hungarian soldiers would have to operate in the future, but that the effects might 
also have global political implications and would likely also generate more natural 
disasters in Hungary.59 The military aspect also seemed obvious, since a Ministry of 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 141. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Francis J. Aguilar, Scanning the Business Environment (New York: Macmillan, 1967).  
58 Among others, see: David Williamson, Strategic Management and Business Analysis (Amsterdam: 
Butterworth-Heineman, 2004), 84–90.; Thomas Del Marmol, PESTLE Analysis (Brussels: Lemaitre 
Publishing, 2015).   
59 Németh, “A PESTEM és PMESII,” 129. 
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Defense should essentially be interested in defense related trends of the macro-
environment.  
Furthermore, the HUN MoD introduced shifting geographic foci to the analysis—
four altogether—and, at the end of the process, used a prioritization technique. The 
analysis’s four geographic foci were Global, European, Regional (neighbors of Hungary), 
and National geographic areas (see Figure 4).60 Regarding the last one, the question may 
emerge as to why a macro-level environmental analysis of a nation’s ministry of defense 
would study the national aspects, too? The reason for including Hungarian National 
geographic areas was that the SAG wanted to discover, inter alia, how Hungarian 
demographic changes, domestic political trends, and expected natural disasters could 
affect the HUN MoD and the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF).61  
 
Figure 4.  PESTEM Analysis for the HUN MoD 
By applying the PESTEM framework, the SAG intended to identify the drivers 
and trends that would affect Hungarian defense until 2030. The difference between a 
driver and a trend is that while a driver “is the agent or factor, which drives a change 
forward,” a trend “is a flow of transformations that cannot be changed easily.”62 For 
instance, Kuosa deems the U.S. space program as a driver which pushed several 
                                                 
60 Németh, “A PESTEM és PMESII,” 129–131. 
61 Hungarian Defence Force is the official name of the Hungarian armed forces. 
62 Kuosa, The Evolution of Strategic Foresight, 36–37. 
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technological developments to achieve strategic goals, like sending men to the Moon.63 
On the other hand, according to Kuosa, trends can be usually identified by “statistics or 
collective agreement,” for instance, the concept that the societies of Western countries are 
ageing.64 
In order to evaluate all possible drivers and trends, the SAG created a step-by-step 
process. First, in order to get a pool of drivers and trends as inclusive as possible, the 
SAG asked every participating organization to identify drivers and trends separately 
based on its own views and focus areas. The five actively participating organizations 
identified altogether more than 700 drivers and trends in this first round. After a series of 
joint sessions, the number of drivers and trends were reduced to a manageable 168 by 
eliminating duplications, developing a common lexicon, and creating draft priorities. 
Once the drivers and trends were properly identified, the SAG next needed to prioritize 
them. During the development and testing of the methodology, experts had agreed that, 
for the final analysis, they would use only the drivers and trends with both the highest 
probability and the highest impact on Hungarian defense. Accordingly, in order to 
prioritize the drivers and trends, every participating organization had to evaluate each of 
the 168, listing one value that that indicated the impact level and a second that indicated 
the probability level. For both values, a zero to ten scale was used where ten represented 
the highest impact or probability. The first number always described the particular 
organization’s view regarding the possible impact of every driver and trend on Hungarian 
defense until 2030, while the second number reflected the organization’s opinion 
regarding the probability of every driver and trend affecting Hungarian defense until 
2030. After every participating organization finished its individual prioritization, the 
SAG collected results and, based on the, numbers provided, created a mean average for 
each impact and each probability of every driver and trend.65 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 36. 
64 Ibid., 37. 
65 Németh, “A PESTEM és PMESII,” 129–135. 
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Finally, the results were projected on a co-ordinate system (see Figure 5), where 
Axis X represented impact and Axis Y represented probability. Thereafter, the SAG 
focused solely on the drivers and trends that were both “High Impact, High Probability” 
quadrant of the co-ordinate system as they were deemed the most influential for 
Hungarian defense. That last step in the prioritization process reduced the number of 
drivers and trends from 168 to 75.66 
Figure 5.  Impact and Probability of Drivers and Trends. 
In the final step of the strategic Foresight analysis, the SAG analyzed and grouped 
the 75 by using issue trees and finding common narratives among the possible drivers and 
                                                 
66 We can see that there are no drivers on the bottom part of the coordinate system; this was the result 
of the pre-prioritization and the eliminating of duplications, which was mentioned earlier. 
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trends. The SAG then drafted a final report detailed in ten chapters that also reflected on 
the groupings created for the drivers and trends. In addition, the report’s Executive 
Summary presented the main findings as threats and opportunities for the Hungarian 
defense until 2030. The final version of the document was submitted in Summer 2014.67 
C. RESULTS OF THE FORESIGHT PROCESS 
The SAG’s strategic Foresight analysis identified ten main themes:68 
1. Changes in the international security environment;  
2. Decrease of the weight of Western-led international organizations;  
3. Slow economic recovery after the financial crisis and its implications;  
4. Changing willingness of using military power; 
5. The transformation of traditional military challenges;  
6. The need for improving the military public administration;  
7. Societal and demographic challenges;  
8. Technology dependence;  
9. Climate change and its implications;  
10. Increasing activity of national security services. 
The themes are obviously were very broad topics, thus every main theme had 
several sub-topics, each elaborated in the Foresight report. This thesis focuses on two of 
these sub-topics for several reasons: they directly relate to the illustrated cases; they help 
illuminate certain shortcomings of the Foresight process; and their analysis accordingly 
provides a good starting point for improving the HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight method. 
Both of these sub-topics belong to the first main theme: “Changes in the 
international security environment.” Within the SAG report, the main purpose of the 
chapter that covers “Changes in the international security environment” was to describe 
the major trends and drivers of the international security environment that had both a high 
                                                 
67 Németh, “A PESTEM és PMESII,” 129–135. 
68 The Foresight report was not classified but was not released to the public in a written form either. 
The results were communicated to analysts and experts outside the MoD in presentations. 
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probability and a high likelihood of directly affecting directly Hungary’s national security 
and thus present the opportunities and threats that the Hungarian defense sector would 
likely have to deal with if these events took place. The Hungarian analysts, among others, 
agreed that East Asia’s economic and military role would increase steadily, thus making 
it likely that rebalancing efforts from the United States would continue, leading to an 
ever-lessening U.S. attention toward Europe. Even the current Russian interventions in 
Ukraine would not stop this trend, although the Russian behavior can slow it down. 
Russia would likely become even more desperate to maintain its big power status and its 
dominant position in the post-Soviet area and would likely be willing to underpin its 
intention by military force as actually happened in Georgia and in Ukraine.  
The SAG report identified other potential changes to the international security 
environment as well, including in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, summarized 
as follows. The number of unstable and failed states globally will likely grow, which may 
destabilize different regions. Certain groups will exploit this situation and will export 
their conflicts to other parts of the world. The Balkans remains unstable in many aspects 
and, because of its proximity to Hungary, any negative development in the Balkans may 
directly impact Hungarian security. Many countries of the MENA region (Middle East 
and North Africa) will likely experience a high level of instability following the Arab 
Spring, further weakening the national institutions and thus likely increasing 
opportunities for extremists to increase their numbers and strengthen their positions. 
Also, many regions of sub-Saharan Africa may become more and more unstable (partly 
as a consequence of the negative developments in the MENA region), and their weak 
security and armed forces will not always be capable of handling terrorism and warlords. 
These developments in the MENA region and sub-Saharan Africa will likely create mass 
migration that then may increase migration pressure on Europe. Globally, the competition 
for the exploitation of the “global commons”69 will likely increase. Although energy 
                                                 
69 According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “the ‘Global Commons’ refers 
to resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political reach of any one nation State. Thus 
international law identifies four global commons namely: the High Seas; the Atmosphere; Antarctica; and, 
Outer Space.” Source: “IEG of the Global Commons,” United Nations Environment Programme, Accessed 
May 24, 2016. http://www.unep.org/delc/GlobalCommons/tabid/54404/.  
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demands will grow, the dynamics of energy related international relations will drastically 
change in the next decade due to new and emerging technologies. 
The brief summary of the SAG report’s first chapter previews some of the main 
conclusions of the document, but, of course, these topics were elaborated in detail within 
the report. The other nine chapters, which introduced the other main themes, similarly 
described several sub-topics that relate to their respective themes. While Chapter III 
examined the reasoning behind the step-by-step process of, and the successful report 
generation of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense’s recent strategic Foresight process, 
Chapter IV examines the shortcomings of the same process by examining two case 
studies that directly relate to two of the sub-topics of “Change in the international 





IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STRATEGIC FORESIGHT 
PROCESS AT THE HUNGARIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
Although the HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight report highlighted some very 
important trends, two issues emerged quickly during the final drafting phase and right 
after the release of the final report in 2014–2015 that both demonstrated shortcomings in 
the Foresight process. In February 2014, Russia intervened in Ukraine. Then, in the 
summer and autumn of 2015, the migration crisis culminated. Interestingly, the analysts 
of the Hungarian MoD more or less foresaw both issues, but they missed the timing of 
the Russian intervention and they did not really believe that the migration crisis would 
happen let alone that it would affect Hungary on a large scale, despite the fact that they 
explicitly stated that likelihood in the Foresight report. Both the Russian intervention in 
Ukraine and the migration crisis had a huge impact on the HUN MoD and the HDF, thus 
it is worth analyzing both cases. While Chapter III detailed the strategic process itself, 
Chapter IV introduces how the analysts considered and what kind of conclusions they 
drew regarding Russian aggression and the migration crisis within their Foresight 
process. The chapter also compares the analysts’ conclusions with the actual events and 
shows how the Ukrainian and migration crises affected the Hungarian defense sector. 
A. RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN UKRAINE 
1.  What did the SAG think about this issue? 
As mentioned earlier, the Foresight process began during the summer of 2013 and 
the final version of the Foresight report was released one year later. Originally, the 
release of the final report was expected in early 2014, but the events in Ukraine overran 
this intention. The prioritization of the trends and drivers were ready at the end of 2013, 
and the SAG grouped them around major themes in the first month of 2014. The drafting 
of the report had already begun when Russia occupied Crimea in late February 2014, but 
the events in Ukraine put the report on hold since the SAG felt it necessary to analyze the 
events and their potential impact on the conclusions of the Foresight report. The sub-topic 
of a resurgent Russia in the first main theme had already been identified during the 
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Foresight process, before the Ukraine events; the Hungarian analysts were aware that 
Russia would likely become more assertive/aggressive in the coming years, and that 
might include the application of military force on Moscow’s part. However, the analysts 
did not think Russian military operations would happen so soon and neither did they 
specify where Russian military intervention might happen.70 
The SAG focused on two main issues regarding Russia during their strategic 
Foresight process. First, the SAG was certain that Russia would remain a major player in 
European politics in the coming 15 years, which would not have been such a certainty in 
the previous 10 or 20 years. Despite the prevalent and well-known demographic71 and 
also economic72 weaknesses of Russia, Moscow could create huge foreign exchange 
reserves and improve the standard of living in the country. In addition, Russian 
leadership seemed willing to pay the price for symbolism by hosting events that could 
help to boost its soft-power and highlight its “greatness” like the Winter Olympic Games 
2014, the Ice Hockey World Cup 2016, and the Soccer World Cup 2018.73 Furthermore, 
during the 2000s, Vladimir Putin’s Russia had become more and more confident in 
representing its interests via different means. For instance, Moscow used natural gas as a 
tool of coercion against Ukraine several times, executed a series of massive cyber attacks 
against Estonia in 2007, and also waged a successful war against Georgia in 2008. 
Simultaneously, Russia confronted Western countries regarding several issues including 
ballistic missile defense and treaty disputes, among others, growing more and more 
assertive.74 All of the above examples increased the SAG’s certainty that Russia would 
likely continue to increase its assertive power stance. 
                                                 
70 The author of the thesis worked as a senior strategic analyst at the DPD and the SAG that time, and 
this statement stems from his own observations. 
71 Julie DaVanzo and Gwendolyn Farnsworth, Russia’s Demographic “Crisis” (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1996).  
72 Vladimir Mau, “Strengths and Weaknesses of the Russian Economy,” Russia in Global Affairs 6, 
no. 1 (2007).  
73 Countries have to apply for the hosting rights of these world events several years before the actual 
events are organized. For instance, Russia was awarded the hosting rights of the 2018 soccer world cup in 
2010. 
74 Laurence Peter, “Why Nato-Russia Relations Soured before Ukraine,” BBC, September 3, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29030744.  
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The SAG also focused on Russian military modernization. In 2008, Russia 
decisively won its war against Georgia in five days.75 However, the war also revealed 
several major weaknesses of the Russian armed forces, most notably the ineffectiveness 
of its command and control system, several technological weaknesses, and significant 
problems with its military personnel.76 As a result, Moscow began a major military 
reform process that, among other things, developed a new military doctrine, aimed at 
increasing the numbers of professional troops and also increasing the defense budget so 
that the Kremlin funded resources for better training, maintenance, and large-scale 
procurements. Perhaps the most relevant sign of Russia’s increased seriousness regarding 
military modernization came in 2010 when Russia started a weapons-modernization plan 
that intended to spend 720 billion dollars on modern weapon systems and equipment 
within the next 10-year period.77 Not surprisingly, the Russian defense budget doubled 
between 2007 and 2014.78 Russia also published a new, modern military doctrine in 
2010,79 which took into consideration the experiences of the Georgian war and also the 
newest developments regarding international security.80 
The SAG was thus aware of both the Russian political willingness to represent 
national interests via different means (including military force) and its rapidly improving 
military capabilities. However, because the Russian military reforms were still in their 
early phase, the SAG deemed that Russia would need more time to achieve its 
modernization plan before beginning another major military intervention. 
 
                                                 
75 Athena Bryce-Rogers, “Russian Military Reform in the Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
War,” Demokratizatsiya 21, no. 3 (2013): 339–368. 
76 Ibid.  




79 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation [Approved by Russian Federation presidential 
edict]. (2010, February 5).  
80 To the surprise of many that time, the Russian military doctrine of 2010 named NATO expansion or 
moving NATO military infrastructure closer to Russia as the most important military threat to Russia. Ibid. 
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2.  What happened and how did it affect the Hungarian Defense Sector? 
To the surprise of most of the SAG analysts, Russia occupied Crimea swiftly and 
bloodlessly in February and March 2014. According to the BBC, the “annexation of 
Crimea was the smoothest invasion of modern times. It was over before the outside world 
realised it had even started.”81 Russian military troops, not wearing “national or unit 
markings, nor badges of rank,” and armed pro-Russian volunteers essentially seized 
Crimea by establishing checkpoints and disarming the local Ukrainian security forces.82 
Also in March 2014, pro-Russian protesters and insurgents appeared in the Eastern part 
of Ukraine in the territory of Donbass, where tensions heightened between pro-Russian 
and pro-Ukrainian troops. The tensions escalated into a bloody conflict, and both Russian 
and Ukrainian troops took part in the fights. Vladimir Putin never admitted officially that 
he sent regular troops to the Donbass territory,83 but many independent sources provided 
persuasive evidence that Russia was involved directly and militarily in the conflict.84 
Despite the fact that Hungary shares a border with Ukraine, Hungarians did not 
feel affected by the conflict right away. However, Hungary’s NATO allies who share a 
border with Russia (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), on the other hand, were 
highly concerned with the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. As an answer to the 
events in Ukraine and for the purpose of assuring the allies who were concerned 
regarding Russian aggressive behavior, the heads of states and heads of governments of 
NATO countries agreed on several measures during the Wales Summit in 2014.85  While 
the conflict itself had not created a direct effect on Hungary, the agreement that resulted 
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82 Ibid. 
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from the Wales Summit then meant that the Russian intervention significantly affected 
the Hungarian defense sector in several aspects. These direct results included: that, 
together with Germany, Hungary took over the air policing tasks of the Baltic States for 
three months in September 2015; that a multinational NATO command center will be set 
up in Hungary;86 that Budapest sent troops to military exercises in the Baltic states; that 
Hungary invested more into its military infrastructure; and that, together with NATO, 
Hungary reviewed and upgraded its military plans.87 In addition, thanks to the increased 
U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe, U.S. troops have been participating more 
frequently in military exercises in Hungary and will also station tanks and armored 
vehicles permanently in one of the HDF’s bases.88 
So, clearly, Hungarian analysts did accurately identify the trends regarding future 
Russian behavior, but they were not specific enough nor did they predict the speed with 
which Russia would utilize military force. The analysts did not focus on where and when 
Russia would likely begin a military intervention; rather, they were satisfied with stating 
the trends and a probability of future Russian military actions. It is true that, even if the 
analysts could have foreseen the Ukrainian crisis exactly, that strategic Foresight could 
not have had a significant impact on the Hungarian MoD’s plans in advance of the events 
in Ukraine as there simply wasn’t enough time. However, it is crucial to understand the 
causes of this shortcoming of the Foresight process and find a way to improve so that the 
Hungarian MoD can be better prepared in the future for events like the Ukrainian crisis 
that may have significant impact on Hungarian defense. 
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B. MIGRATION CRISIS 
1.  What did the SAG think about this issue? 
In terms of migration, the SAG report explicitly stated that the handling of mass, 
illegal migration from the MENA and sub-Saharan regions was going to be a significant 
challenge for Europe in the coming period. Migration had already represented a serious 
risk both to the Mediterranean countries and specifically to Hungary. The SAG analysts 
were clear that more and more migrants would come to Europe. The analysts considered 
both the instability that had emerged after the Arab Spring in the MENA region and 
especially the devastating effect of the Syrian civil war that had already triggered huge 
waves of refugees as trends worthy of close attention. Previously, illegal migration 
affected primarily the Mediterranean countries especially Italy and Greece, the two 
countries closest to the unstable regions. Migrants had attempted to get to these countries 
mostly by boat via the Mediterranean Sea, and many of them died trying to reach the 
shores of Europe. However, from 2012, the number of illegal migrants arriving in 
Hungary also increased dramatically. While only 2200 migrants were registered in 
Hungary in 2012, that number increased by nearly twenty times in 2014 (43,000).89 
Accordingly, the dynamics in the MENA region and the trend of the increasing number 
of migrants showed clearly that migration would create significant problems in Hungary. 
Although the analysts at the MoD came to the right conclusion and included their 
accurate predictions in the Foresight report, they did not believe that migration would 
affect Hungary seriously probably because Hungary is usually not a target country for 
migrants, and analysts did not see that changing.90 Another reason why the analysts did 
not focus much on migration was that the HDF did not have any assigned tasks regarding 
migration. Namely, the Hungarian law about defense did not mention any issues that 
would connect the HDF with a possible involvement in handling mass migration. 
Previously, for the last 15 to 20 years, the HDF had focused mostly on the participation in 
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NATO and EU missions abroad, and, for domestic purposes, it was used only during 
disaster relief operations. As migration represented neither a mission nor a natural 
disaster, no legal framework nor precedent existed that would have alerted the analysts to 
more cautiously and seriously consider the possible effects of migration on Hungarian 
defense. 
2.  What happened and how did it affect the Hungarian Defense Sector? 
In 2015, the pace of arrival of migrants to Hungary increased rapidly, resulting in 
chaotic scenes in various refugee camps, public parks, major railway stations in the 
capital, and also on highways as thousands began to walk through Hungary en route to 
Germany. In the first ten months of 2015, the number of migrants that arrived in Hungary 
reached 36000091 nearly a ten times increase in less than a year. Hungary thus became 
one of the main entry points to the EU Schengen Zone for irregular migrants in 2015, 
and, in the first six months of 2015, Hungary also had the highest number of first time 
asylum applicants relative to the population among the EU members.92 The dramatic 
increase was caused by many migrants opting for the so-called Balkan migrant route 
instead of the more dangerous routes through the Mediterranean Sea. Most of the 
migrants did not want to settle down in Hungary; they wanted to travel to more 
developed EU countries.93 However, according to EU regulations, they had to register as 
asylum-seekers in the first EU country they arrived in, and they should have waited for 
the end of their asylum-seeking process, a process that can last several months. Many 
migrants did not intend to stay in Hungary for the duration of the asylum-seeking process 
and, as no border control exists in the EU Schengen Zone, thought they could pass 
through Hungary relatively easily.94 
                                                 
91 “Mintegy 357 Ezer Bevándorló érkezett Eddig Magyarországra,” Hirado.hu, November 12, 2015. 
http://www.hirado.hu/2015/10/12/357-ezernel-is-tobb-bevandorlo-erkezett-eddig-magyarorszagra/.  
92 “Over 210 000 first time asylum seekers in the EU in the second quarter of 2015,” Eurostat, 
September 18, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6996925/3–18092015-BP-
EN.pdf/b0377f79-f06d-4263-aa5b-cc9b4f6a838f. 
93 Nick Thorpe, “Migrant crisis: Hungary surge as fence slowly rises,” BBC, August 24, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34043344. 
94 “Europe migrants: Tracing perilous Balkan route to Germany,” BBC, August 26, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34039968. 
 32
In June 2015, faced with waves of migrants, the Hungarian government 
announced that it would close its border with Serbia—where the vast majority of the 
migrants entered Hungary—by building a border fence 110 miles long and 4 meters 
high95 The HDF was responsible for the construction of the fence. Three months later, in 
mid-September, the Hungarian government announced that the fence along its southern 
border with Serbia was complete.96 
To further ensure the security of the borders, the Hungarian government gave new 
powers to the police and the military and also changed laws to criminalize migration. 
New legislation allowed the military to take part in border control activities and gave it 
the right to use 
coercive weapons designed to cause bodily harm, although in a non-lethal 
way, unless it cannot be avoided. […] Similar to the police, the use of 
non-lethal firearms, rubber bullets, pyrotechnics, tear gas grenades, and 
net guns can be used [by the military].97 
In September, 4500 Hungarian troops were deployed to the borders within a very 
short period of time to patrol and strengthen the border fence physically. Furthermore, the 
Hungarian government declared a state of emergency in the areas affected by mass 
migration.98 Right after the closing of the Hungarian/Serbian border, migrants who 
wanted to enter Hungary clashed with Hungarian police, and the police used tear gas and 
water canons to disperse the rioters.99 Thereafter, only a very small number of migrants 
attempted to enter to Hungary illegally from Serbia, and the vast majority of migrants 
changed their routes to travel through Croatia. 
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A few days later, Croatia began to transport migrants by buses to its Hungarian 
and Slovenian borders, and Hungarian and Slovenian authorities transported them 
directly to their respective Austrian borders. At the same time, the HDF began to build a 
fence on the Hungarian-Croatian border as well. One month later, Hungary announced 
the completion of the Hungary/Croatia border fence, and thus the border with Croatia 
also closed to migrants.100 After this, all of the migrants were diverted towards Croatia 
and Slovenia, and basically, illegal migration stopped in Hungary. It is important to note 
that, as a consequence of necessarily stopping the migration crisis, border patrolling and 
upgrading the border fence became a core function of the HDF. Though both events had 
significant impacts, the migration crisis has had an even bigger impact on Hungarian 
defense than did the Russian military intervention in Ukraine.  
Using strategic Foresight, the HUN MoD analysts drew accurate conclusions 
concerning the causes and trends of mass migration on Europe and included the 
possibility that Hungary would be directly affected. However, despite their own accurate 
conclusions, somehow even they did not think that it would really happen, and they did 
not predict any necessary roles for the Hungarian MoD and the HDF. The analysts and 
decision makers probably focused too much on the existing tasks and did not consider the 
potential that the legal framework would dramatically shift to include possible HDF tasks 
in a migration crisis. The Hungarian MoD did not think outside the box in this regard and 
did not take into consideration that legislation can change rapidly in crisis situations as 
happened in 2015. As the Hungarian MoD did not further consider the possible effects of 
mass migration and did not envision new tasks mass migration might generate for 
Hungarian defense, the HDF initially was not prepared when the crisis did happen. The 
troops were not trained for the new tasks, plans did not exist, and the HDF lacked certain 
capabilities as well.101 In fact, the Hungarian defense minister resigned in September 
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2015 because the construction of the border fence did not progress appropriately.102 The 
events surrounding the migration crisis clearly demonstrate that only the identification of 
a risk or threat is not enough. The strategic Foresight process needs another step that 
focuses on future possibilities and plans concerning identified risks, because, if the 
possible futures do become reality, the organization needs to be prepared.  
Chapter IV has demonstrated that both the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the 
mass migration clearly demonstrate the need for further analysis and improved strategic 
Foresight, as well as the need for the HUN MoD to take their strategic predictions and the 
strategic process as a whole quite seriously. Chapter V examines how applying Foresight 
diagnostic tools will improve the Hungarian Ministry of Defense’s strategic Foresight 
and consequent planning.  
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC FORESIGHT PROCESS OF 
THE HUN MOD 
While the previous two chapters showed how the strategic Foresight process of 
the HUN MoD works, including what kind of results it generated and what kind of 
shortcomings it had, Chapter V attempts to figure out why these shortcomings might have 
evolved and how Foresight’s diagnostic tools can help. For this purpose, the thesis further 
details then utilizes Joseph Voros’s generic Foresight framework, already briefly 
described in Chapter II. Voros’s framework is widely cited and widely accepted in the 
Foresight literature, and it is not only a great guide for the process of strategic Foresight, 
but it also can serve as a diagnostic tool for analyzing the steps of the HUN MoD’s 
already existing Foresight processes. After explaining how Voros’s framework can be 
used as a diagnostic tool, the thesis utilizes said framework to diagnose the cause(s) of 
the shortcomings examined in Chapter IV. When the diagnosis is ready, the thesis digs 
deeper, attempting to identify the organizational dynamics at the HUN MoD that may 
have caused the shortcomings of the Foresight process.  
A. VOROS’S GENERIC FORESIGHT FRAMEWORK 
As mentioned earlier, Voros used several results of strategic management and 
Foresight to develop his generic Foresight framework. He took Averil Horton’s guide to 
Foresight103 as a basis. Horton conceptualized Foresight as a three phase process, where 
phase one is the input phase (collection, collation, summarization of information), phase 
two is Foresight (“translation” and interpretation of the summarized knowledge), and 
phase three is providing outputs and taking actions based on the Foresight results.104 
Applying Mintzberg’s separation of strategic thinking and strategic planning,105 Voros 
divided Horton’s third phase into two steps: outputs and strategy (making).106 In this 
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way, Voros made clear that strategic Foresight is a strategic thinking activity that ends by 
providing Foresight results (outputs) to the decision makers. Accordingly, any actions 
based on the outputs of Foresight are already part of strategic planning. Finally, Voros 
enriched his framework with Richard Slaughter’s concept about Foresight methodologies. 
Slaughter distinguished four main groups of Foresight methods: 1) input methods;  
2) analytic methods; 3) paradigmatic methods; and 4) iterative and exploratory 
methods.107 In some cases, Voros could apparently apply Slaughter’s Foresight method 
types directly to the steps of his generic Foresight framework (input methods to the step 
of inputs, for example); in other cases, Voros had to fine-tune certain steps and 
methodology categories to match each other (see Figure 6 ). 
 
Figure 6.  Voros’s Foresight Framework, with Some Representative 
Methodologies Indicated.108 
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As shown in Figure 6, Voros had created an easily understandable, structured, and 
pragmatic generic Foresight process. At each phase, it not only asks the questions 
analysts should be able to answer but also introduces the appropriate activities and 
possible methods regarding the individual steps. Voros’s framework can be summarized 
as follows.109 
1. Inputs:  
 Question: No question.  
 Activity: In this phase, the organization collects and summarizes 
the relevant information and scans the environment for strategic 
intelligence. 
 Methods: strategic intelligence scanning, Delphi, near-future 
context, PEST, et cetera.  
2. Foresight: This phase is basically the heart of the framework where the 
conceptual and creative work has to be done in three consecutive steps. 
I. Analysis: 
 Question: What seems to be happening? 
 Activity: Creating order in the information gathered in the input 
phase, which is often executed by categorizing the information 
with the help of different methods.110 This is a “preliminary stage 
to more in-depth work, rather than as a stand-alone technique 
itself.”111 
 Methods: emerging issues, trends analysis, cross-impact analysis, 
et cetera. 
II. Interpretation: 
 Question: What is really happening? 
 Activity: The intention here is to gain a more thorough 
understanding of the knowledge created in the previous steps. 
Thus, Foresight analysts attempt to dig below the surface to find 
“deeper structure and insight” concerning their strategic 
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environment.112 They may also “challenge the categories used to 
analyze data, by trying to identify and surface the worldview 
underpinning those categories.”113 
 Methods: systems thinking, causal layered analysis etc. 
III. Prospection: 
 Question: What might happen? 
 Activity: Voros defines prospection as “the activity of purposefully 
looking forward to create forward views.”114 Accordingly, 
different types of alternative futures are taken into consideration 
and studied in this step. The applied methodologies depend here on 
the types of futures (see later) to be reviewed.115 Maree Conway 
highlights that prospective work has to shift “the mental model of 
the participants” from the current common knowledge to new 
possibilities and also shift “the focus and thinking from short term 
to long term.”116 
 Methods: scenarios, visioning, normative methods, backcasts, et 
cetera. 
3. Outputs: 
 Question: What might we need to do?  
 Activity: Voros differentiates between tangible and intangible 
outputs. Tangible outputs are the reports, documents, and options 
created during the process, while intangible outputs—the more 
important ones—are the organization’s changed views and 
perceptions about futures and strategic options generated by 
Foresight. 
 Methods: reports, presentations, workshops, multimedia, et cetera. 
4. Strategy 
 Questions: What will we do? How will we do it? 
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 Activity: The Foresight process ends at the output phase, and the 
strategy phase uses the results of the Foresight process to develop a 
strategy for the organization.  
 Methods: strategy development and strategic planning at the 
individual, workgroup, organizational, and societal levels et 
cetera.117 
An integral part of Voros’s framework is the distinction between different types 
of futures. Foresight analysts accept that they are not able to predict the future exactly, 
thus they often create alternative futures to draw attention to different possible threats and 
opportunities. Voros points out that, when choosing among different methods in the 
prospection step, the type of futures the stakeholders intend to generate and study must be 
considered.118 Voros argues that, in order to fully consider all possible futures, analysts 
must first accept the ontological premise that the future is not predetermined and singular 
but rather that “an infinite variety of potential futures” exist.119 If analysts or stakeholders 
do not accept this premise, and instead stick with a predestined view of the future, 
Foresight becomes “merely an information problem,” or merely an attempt to find more 
accurate information about what will happen in the future. Of course, even in this case 
the future will not become more predictable, since it is not possible to foresee 
everything.120  
Voros describes five types of futures (see Figure 7). Potential futures are the most 
inclusive ones, as this category contains all futures as yet imagined. Possible futures are 
the futures we can imagine, and it does not matter how unlikely they are. Plausible 
futures are the ones that are “considered reasonable by our current understanding of how 
the world operates.”121 While probable futures, the category of “likely to happen,” 
usually based on linear extension of current trends, events, and phenomena are entirely 
contained within plausible futures, the reader may notice that the last group of futures, 
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preferable futures (not based on information but rather on what kind of futures we would 
like to have) are almost all, but not quite, plausible.  
 
Figure 7.  Different Types of Futures According to Voros.122 
B. VOROS’S FRAMEWORK AS A DIAGNOSTIC TOOL 
Voros’s framework can be useful as a diagnostic tool to improve Foresight 
processes. Among other things, it can help to evaluate the logic of the existing Foresight 
processes, it provides options how and when certain methodologies should be used, and 
what practices should be applied in the different phases of Foresight. However, in our 
case, the most important innovation is that Voros developed several diagnostic models 
for situations when the Foresight process does not include all of the phases of Figure 6.  
One of these less-than-complete models is called “reactive strategy” or reactive 
approach. Reactive approaches occur when an organization reacts directly to the events 
of its environment without any analysis, interpretation, prospection, and/or outputs (see 
Figure 8). Basically, the organization reacts “instinctively” usually based on what 
organizational culture and policy options are embedded into the mental model of the 
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decision makers of the organization. In acting with reactive approaches rather than on 
strategic planning, decision makers often believe that they are highly responsive, but they 
can forget that they are not considering all of their options, thus their response can easily 
become sub-optimal.123 
 
Figure 8.  Reactive Approach.124 
The “shallow Foresight process” (see Figure 9) is another Voros model that does 
not include all the steps from Figure 6. Voros points out that many organizations function 
this way. In the shallow Foresight process, the organization analyzes the inputs and 
recognizes trends or themes of its strategic environment, but the output of their analysis 
will be “thin.” He further highlights that the shallow Foresight process is  
an approach [that] undertakes strategic processes based merely on what 
seems to be happening in the strategic environment, absent any attempt to 
look deeper, or to explicitly examine forward views. The strategic options 
so produced are therefore rather suspect.125 
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Figure 9.  Shallow Foresight Process.126 
The third model of Foresight that fails to consider each of Voros’s steps is the 
“shallow/narrow” model (see Figure 10). In this case, although analysis is followed by 
prospection, interpretation is still missing. In most cases, no interpretation means that, 
based directly on the revealed trends provided by the analysis phase, the analysts are 
creating “visioning” exercises, scenario planning for instance.127 Therefore, although 
analysts are doing forward thinking, their prospection remains narrow, based on a single 
analysis rather than on an in depth interpretation regarding the question of “what is really 
happening.” According to Voros, the shallow/narrow approach is even more dangerous 
than the shallow model because analysts will suffer the illusion that they have created a 
more accurate Foresight. Voros states that “there is essentially no difference in the quality 
of the strategic options generated by this modification—they are still rather suspect, 
based as they are on a narrow set of forward views flowing from a shallow and 
incomplete Foresight process.”128 
                                                 






Figure 10.  Shallow/Narrow Foresight Process.129 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE HUN MOD’S STRATEGIC FORESIGHT PROCESS 
Now, the thesis analyzes the HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight process, with the 
help of Voros’ generic Foresight framework, in order to diagnose the cause(s) of the 
shortcomings of the HUN MoD’s recent strategic Foresight process. As Chapter IV 
described, the shortcomings included the fact that, although the SAG identified the 
Russian aggression and the migration crisis, they missed either the timing of the event or 
did not imagine and therefore plan for their predictions coming true. To discern whether 
the causes of these issues were methodological, practical, or logical, the thesis studies 
how the SAG executed the individual phases of Voros’s framework based on the HUN 
MoD’s step by step process described in Chapter III. 
1. Inputs 
In the inputs phase, the participants of a Foresight process gather information and 
scan the strategic environment. The HUN MoD SAG engaged in gathering and scanning 
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systematically and extensively, devoting approximately five months in 2013 to the inputs 
phase. The SAG not only analyzed existing Foresight and strategic documents, it 
reviewed literature on several topics and also consulted with domain-specific external 
experts. In addition, SAG used the PESTEM method to identify trends and drivers on 
different geographic levels (Global, European, Regional, National) and subject areas 
(political, economic, social, technology, environment, military). Accordingly, the SAG 
appropriately engaged in the inputs phase. 
2. Foresight 
a. Analysis 
The main task in the analysis phase is to create order among the huge amount of 
information gathered during the input phase. To analyze the data, the SAG used different 
methods. First, utilizing the PESTEM method, the SAG created a categorization in terms 
of geographic areas and subjects. SAG made a further categorization step by prioritizing 
trends and drivers based on their probability and impact. Finally, the SAG grouped  
the most relevant variables into ten main themes. The SAG used three levels of 
categorization (PESTEM, prioritization, and themes) to create order among the 
information gathered and also provided answers to the question of the analysis step: 
“what seems to be happening.” Based on the analysis steps above, the SAG analyzed the 
information collected in the inputs phase thoroughly.  
b. Interpretation 
In the interpretation step, analysts should generate insight about knowledge 
acquired by the inputs and analysis steps. However, SAG missed this step.  
c. Prospection 
In the prospection step, analysts purposefully study alternative futures to kick the 
organization out from its comfort zone, shifting people’s mental models out of common 
beliefs and shared perceptions of the future, making room for the possible of alternative 
potential futures. Rather than applying more out of the box thinking, SAG looked 
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exclusively for the most probable future, neither considering alternative futures possible 
or even probable. In other words, SAG made no attempt to do this step.  
3. Outputs 
SAG provided tangible outputs in the form of reports and presentations. The 
intangible output was that a systematic Foresight process was executed at the HUN MoD 
for the first time, and the organization accepted the necessity of strategic Foresight. 
However, the strategic Foresight process did not change the views and perceptions about 
futures and strategic options in the HUN MoD. Therefore, this step was not completed 
effectively. 
4. Strategy 
The Foresight process was one of the inputs for developing a strategy for the 
HUN MoD. During the strategy making phase, the results of the Foresight process were 
used. Accordingly, the strategy phase was executed properly.  
D. DIAGNOSIS 
The above analysis highlighted that, although the inputs, analysis and strategy 
phases were executed properly, the interpretation and prospection phases were missing 
from the HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight process. Of Voros’s diagnostic models, the 
HUN MoD’s recent strategic Foresight process thus belongs to the “shallow Foresight” 
category (Figure 9), since the source of the outputs stemmed only from the results of the 
analysis phase. According to Voros, shallow Foresight “produces a fairly thin set of 
outputs based on the clear and obvious present.”130 These outputs usually only reveal 
trends (which they did) and thus provide a superficial picture about the future, rather than 
including insights possibly discovered in the interpretation phase and alternative futures 
discovered during the prospection phase. Therefore, strategic options resulting from the 
HUN MoD’s process remain “suspect.”  
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This diagnosis resonates well with the shortcomings of the HUN MoD’s strategic 
Foresight process. In regard to the Russian intervention in Ukraine and the migration 
crisis, SAG accurately identified the trends, but the results of the Foresight remained 
superficial. SAG was aware of the more assertive/aggressive Russian behavior in 
international politics and the trend of the ever-increasing Russian defense budgets. The 
HUN MoD’s experts also knew about the increasing number of illegal migrants arriving 
in Europe in general and to Hungary in particular, and it was clear that the causes of mass 
migration would not disappear in the foreseeable future. From these trends, SAG 
concluded that Russia would be more aggressive in the future and would be willing to use 
military force, and they foresaw that migration will cause bigger problems for Hungary. 
Thus, the output of the SAG strategic Foresight process regarding Russia represented an 
accurate analysis without specificity as to the timing or location of the Russian military 
intervention, and, even though the SAG also accurately foresaw increasing mass 
migration, SAG did not believe that it would actually happen and could not imagine a 
situation where the HDF would have any role in handling mass migration. Accordingly, 
the results of the strategic Foresight process were more educated guesses based on trends, 
or, as Voros puts it, the conclusions remained “rather suspect.”131 Probably, the 
incorporation of the interpretation and prospection phases into the HUN MoD’s strategic 
Foresight process could have provided a deeper and more thorough analysis of different 
futures. This could have increased the probability that the HUN MoD may have become 
more aware of a Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the impacts of mass illegal 
migration on the HDF. 
To fully utilize strategic Foresight, analysts must find a way to include insight. 
The main tasks of the interpretation phase are going beyond the surface, challenging the 
current knowledge, and avoiding shortsightedness, a pitfall of the shallow analysis model. 
According to Richard Nelson, the “antidote” of shortsightedness is the type of insight that 
he defines as “the ability to see a situation in its full complexity.”132 While Nelson 
accepts that it is not possible to see anything “in its full complexity” in real life, he finds 
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it necessary to find and understand the most relevant factors of the studied events and 
processes.133 He also points out that Andrew Marshall, the former head of the Pentagon’s 
Office of Net Assessment (ONA), was a master of providing strategic insight.134 
Marshall led ONA for more than four decades. During this time, he created analytical 
frameworks and provided analyses in order to understand “the fundamental character of 
competitive situations”; Marshall’s analyses “led to sound competitive strategies” that 
gave relevant advantage to the United States.135 Marshall also developed the so-called 
net-assessment framework, an “interdisciplinary, empirically driven, and diagnostic”136 
approach based on his interest and research on “organizational behavior research, 
research on (business) strategy, and the evolutionary and cultural views of human 
nature.”137 Although Marshall and ONA were probably not aware of Voros’s framework, 
their most commonly used methods of net assessment (trend analysis, considered 
judgment, scenarios, and war games)138 correspond with Voros’s three Foresight phase 
steps: 
1. analysis: trend analysis;  
2. interpretation: considered judgment;  
3. prospection: scenarios and war games. 
If SAG had used Andrew Marshall’s approach (not necessarily in terms of 
methodology, but in terms of intellectual foundations), HUN MoD would have had a 
bigger chance to foresee the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Namely, SAG could have 
asked certain questions to dig deeper and get insight about Russian intentions. For 
instance, SAG could have discussed why Russia was increasing its defense budget, for 
what would Moscow be likely to use their increasing military might, and what system 
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dynamics might underlie the surface of this trend. However, SAG did not ask these 
questions but was instead satisfied with a more generic assessment.  
The prospection phase could also have helped SAG leave its comfort zone and 
previous mental models by considering alternative futures. For instance, after digging 
deeper regarding Russian intentions for using military force, SAG could have created 
scenarios regarding where, when, and why Russia might intervene militarily. Asking the 
when question in this phase could have at least generated guesses about the timing of a 
Russian military intervention. The prospection step probably also would have helped to 
make the SAG believe that a migration crisis would affect Hungary and may have 
generated the idea that the HDF might need to be involved. SAG could have made 
different scenarios or visioning exercises based on different numbers of migrants crossing 
the Hungarian border and “played” out how Hungarian society and government would 
react to these different scenarios. With the prospection step, the HDF would have had a 
bigger chance to realize earlier that, after a certain number of migrants, the government 
would have no choice but to close its borders and involve the HDF in maintaining border 
security. In many other ways as well, interpretation and prospection would help to open 
the HUN MoD to not yet considered possibilities and therefore strategic options for 
potential, and, obviously, in the two illustrated cases, more than probable futures. 
Mie Augier points out that Andrew Marshall thought, “if we have an intellectual 
structure for what we do and how we think on such strategic issues, we will be in a better 
position to understand (and act on) our competitive strengths and weaknesses.”139 Taking 
Marshall’s approach, the goal of Foresight at the HUN MoD is not to foresee everything 
perfectly. Nothing guarantees that the inclusion of the interpretation and prospection 
phases would have definitely meant that the SAG would have foreseen exactly what 
happened regarding Ukraine and the migration crisis. However, including the 
interpretation and prospection phases will definitely increase the chances to foresee 
another event and also will likely lend a depth of specificity and precision to a statement 
like “Russia will probably use military force in the future.” With a less “shallow” 
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Foresight process, the HUN MoD would have been “in a better position to understand” 
its “competitive strengths and weaknesses”140 and could have adapted to the changing 
circumstances faster. 
E. CAUSES OF THE HUN MOD’S SHALLOW FORESIGHT PROCESS 
The previous section diagnosed the HUN MoD’s Foresight process in 2013–2014 
as an ultimately “shallow” one, despite the extensive work put in by many people, since it 
did not include the interpretation and prospection phases of Voros’s generic Foresight 
framework. Also, the previous section showed that the “shallowness” of the Foresight 
process was probably the main source of the shortcomings. So, why did the HUN MoD’s 
Foresight process become “shallow”? Why was SAG satisfied with the completion of the 
analysis phase rather than looking for insights (interpretation phase) and alternative 
futures (prospection phase)?  
To address these questions, as a starting point, it is worth studying the Foresight 
methods the SAG used. The applied methods can provide important information about 
the HUN MoD organizational culture and thus can give hints as to why the HUN MoD’s 
Foresight process was designed without interpretation or prospection in mind. Rafael 
Popper categorizes the Foresight methods into four groups based on their type of 
knowledge source:141  
 Creativity-based methods are usually a “mixture of original and 
imaginative thinking” where innovation and inspiration plays an important 
role; 
 Expertise-based methods exploit the knowledge and skills of subject-
matter experts;  
 Interaction-based methods generate knowledge by bringing together 
participants with different expertise into an interactive environment; 
 Evidence-based methods usually rely on documents, quantitative and 
statistical information. 
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Figure 11.  Capabilities of Most Commonly Used Foresight Methods (numbers 
indicate the popularity of the method where one is the most popular).142 
Popper also researched which Foresight methods are the most popular. He 
examined 886 Foresight studies, and, based on his research, projected the 13 most 
popular methods into a “diamond” that also shows the knowledge base of each method 
(see Figure 11).143 Of the 13 methods identified by Popper, the SAG used five: literature 
review, scanning,144 extrapolation,145 interviews,146 and expert panel.147 Figure 11 shows 
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environmental, and military processes and phenomena, as well as others. 
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that three (literature review, extrapolation, and scanning) of the five methods are purely 
evidence-based, one (interviews) is on the border between the evidence-based and expert-
based methods, and the remaining one (expert panel) is expert-based. In terms of 
methods, then, the HUN MoD’s Foresight process was heavily evidence-based with some 
expert-based inputs. However, both the creativity-based and interaction-based methods 
were entirely missing from the process. Usually, these are the methods that provide 
insight (interpretation phase) and help to study alternative futures (prospection phase). 
Based then on the research of both Voros and Popper, the HUN MoD did not consider 
either insights or alternative futures.  
Probably, the most surprising phenomenon is that scenarios are missing from the 
methods SAG used, despite the fact that this method is very popular in the Foresight 
studies of public administration and defense organizations.148 Interestingly, the 
application of scenarios were considered during the early development phase of the HUN 
MoD’s Foresight process, but the idea was rejected with the argument that the HUN 
MoD did not have the resources for that.149 The developers of the SAG method 
(including the author of the thesis) deemed that the experts of SAG would be already 
overburdened without scenario exercises, as they had to complete their “normal” job 
besides their participation in SAG. However, there was no real objection against this 
decision, and, for the participants of SAG, it felt natural to focus solely on the most 
probable futures rather than on alternative futures. While that reasoning makes sense, it 
unfortunately meant that the prospection phase went missing. 
Gloria Appiah and David Sarpong highlight that organizational routines have 
significant impact on strategic Foresight.150 One type of routine they focus on is 
                                                                                                                                                 
146 SAG invited subject matter experts to give presentations and discuss certain topics. 
147 SAG was basically an expert panel. 
148 Popper, “How Are Foresight Methods Selected?” 74. 
149 The author of the thesis worked as a senior strategic analyst at the DPD and the SAG that time, and 
this statement stems from his own observations. 
150 Gloria Appiah and David Sarpong. “On the Influence of Organisational Routines on Strategic 
Foresight” Foresight 17, no. 5 (2015): 512–527, doi:10.1108/fs-11–2014–0067.  
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“recurrent interaction patterns which are performed by participant of routines.”151 The 
most important routines at the HUN MoD regarding future thinking are reading 
intelligence reports and consultation with operational and strategic level military 
intelligence analysts. Strategic Foresight activities cannot really be called routine at the 
HUN MoD considering the first systematic and structured Foresight process happened in 
2013–2014 as described by this thesis. Also, the possibility that the intelligence mindset 
and the institutionalized routines related to intelligence activities at the HUN MoD 
impacted the Foresight process cannot be excluded. Although intelligence and Foresight 
typically supplement and enrich each other with their different foci, in the case of the 
HUN MoD, it is a possibility that the Foresight process has become “intelligencized” 
because of the strongly intelligence-focused routines of the organization.  
In general, intelligence looks for “specific, fact-based answers to specific 
questions,” providing information on predictable matters.152 In addition, information 
provided by intelligence reports relies on different, reliable, and independent sources, and 
intelligence analysts are looking for facts and evidence.153 This also means that they 
rarely take into consideration alternative futures; rather, they are interested in the 
probabilities of future events based on current facts. According to the terms of Voros, 
they are only interested in the “probable” future. Future is not plural in this case, as 
intelligence analysts’ ontological assumption about the future is often singular, thus they 
perceive the problem of foreseeing future events as an information-gathering problem. 
Foresight asks broader questions, has a deeper horizon, and also studies less predictable 
issues. Foresight is less obsessed with sources and evidences, but it attempts to think 
critically about long-term developments to identify threats and opportunities. Foresight 
takes interest in alternative futures in order to broaden the organization’s perspective 
regarding future possibilities by challenging assumptions and even “thinking about the 
unthinkable.”154 
                                                 
151 Ibid., 516. 
152 John Michael Schmidt, “Policy, Planning, Intelligence and Foresight in Government 
Organizations.” Foresight 17, no. 5 (2015): 493. doi:10.1108/fs-12–2014–0081. 
153 Ibid., 489–496. 
154 See: Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable. 
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The HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight process bore many characteristics of 
intelligence work. It focused on the most probable future outcome, it was not interested in 
alternative futures, its methodology was mostly evidence-based, it did not challenge 
assumptions, and it did not broaden the perspective of the organization about futures. The 
HUN MoD’s Foresight work resembles an open-source long-term intelligence report 
much more than it does a Foresight study. The surprising thing is how naturally both the 
SAG and the HUN MoD accepted this approach, that they did not feel it problematic at 
all. However, it is less surprising considering that intelligence-like future thinking 
resonated very well with the organizational routines of the HUN MoD. Most members of 
SAG read intelligence reports for their everyday work, and some SAG members were 
intelligence analysts themselves.155  
The evidence-based, probabilistic, singular-future-focused intelligence mindset of 
the HUN MoD may explain why the SAG did not engage in the prospection phase or 
consider alternative futures. However, it does not necessarily explain why SAG also 
missed the interpretation phase, or why it did not try to dig deeper and come out with 
insights concerning certain focus areas, as interpretative analysis is common to 
intelligence work. The most probable explanation is that the SAG did not have extensive 
knowledge and experience about how to conduct a Foresight study properly. Despite the 
fact that the possibility of including scenarios (prospection phase) into the Foresight 
process was debated during the development of the HUN MoD’s method, aspects of the 
interpretation phase were never discussed. This shows that the SAG and the developers of 
the Foresight process (including the author of this thesis) were not prepared enough 
regarding the methodologies of strategic Foresight.  
Chapter V has considered reasoning the causes of the shortcomings of the 
Foresight process at the HUN MoD, and Chapter VI gives final conclusions and 
recommendations. 
                                                 
155 The author of the thesis worked as a senior strategic analyst at the DPD and the SAG that time, and 
this statement stems from his own observations. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis attempted to answer why the HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight process 
could accurately predict Russian aggressive behavior including the use of military force 
and also accurately predict the European migration crisis, yet the experts of the HUN 
MoD did not predict the timing of the events (Russian military intervention in Ukraine) 
and did not believe that their conclusions would come true (European migration crisis). 
To address the core question of these shortcomings, this thesis introduced the evolution 
and main concepts of Futures Studies including Foresight, described the Hungarian 
strategic Foresight process and its results, explained how the Hungarian experts of SAG 
were thinking about Russian aggressive behavior and the migration crisis before the 
events started, and compared that thinking to the actual events.  
Finally, the thesis analyzed the HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight process with the 
help of Voros’s generic Foresight framework and confirmed those findings with Popper’s 
categories of Foresight methodology methods. Based on this analysis, the thesis has come 
to the following three conclusions: 
1. The HUN MoD’s strategic Foresight process had a relevant 
methodological flaw. In Voros’s methodological terms, HUN MoD’s 
process missed the interpretation and prospection phases and became a so-
called “shallow” Foresight, because, after the analysis of the collected 
information (analysis phase), it provided the outputs without developing 
insights (interpretation phase) and studying alternative futures 
(prospection phase).  
2. The reason why the interpretation phase, where insights should have been 
developed, was missing was that the developers of the Foresight process 
were not prepared appropriately concerning Foresight methodologies. 
3. The reason why the prospection phase, where alternative futures should 
have been studied, was missing stemmed from the HUN MoD’s 
intelligence-focused mindset. Intelligence work does not deal with 





future. As the most relevant routines regarding future thinking of the HUN 
MoD relate to intelligence work, no one felt it problematic that only the 
most probable future was studied while no alternative futures were 
considered by SAG. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations below aim to improve the HUN MoD’s future Foresight 
processes by addressing the three conclusions mentioned above.156  
Improve the methodology of Foresight: 
The current HUN MoD Foresight process has to be improved by adding the 
currently missing interpretation and prospection phases. As several Foresight frameworks 
and dozens of Foresight methods exist, the development of the Foresight process needs 
relevant research and extensive experimenting. The HUN MoD should sponsor research 
projects concerning methodological issues and should experiment and test itself to figure 
out which frameworks and methods are most appropriate for its organizational 
capabilities and dynamics. It is important to note that the improvement of the strategic 
Foresight process should build on the already achieved successes and existing 
methodology of the SAG so as to benefit from the previous development of the Foresight 
process rather than starting from scratch and also so that the expertise acquired during the 
first SAG stays relevant.  
Build Foresight capacity: 
To better understand Foresight methods, the HUN MoD should educate their 
experts in this regard. This may happen by inviting Foresight experts to give lectures and 
workshops, and certain experts of the HUN MoD could be sent for short and long term 
courses or field trips to institutions that have relevant knowledge and expertise regarding 
Foresight. 
The HUN MoD should also launch a strategic Foresight internships initiative for 
graduate students whose thesis research is related to Foresight or those who have 
                                                 
156 The recommendations take into consideration and are based on the intellectual foundations of 
Andrew Marshall’s net assessment framework (organizational behavior and limited rationality; extending 
the understanding of organizations to strategy; and evolutionary and cultural perspectives on human 
nature). See: Augier, “Thinking about War and Peace,” 5–10. 
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experience on Foresight work. These interns could not only alleviate some burden of the 
SAG during the execution of the Foresight process (completing extensive literature 
reviews, for example), but the most talented ones could also be hired after the end of their 
internship, bringing relevant knowledge on Foresight into the HUN MoD. 
Raise awareness on the differences between intelligence work and Foresight work: 
To begin to change the intelligence focused mind-set that exist at the HUN MoD, 
the SAG should organize Foresight workshops that demonstrate the usefulness of 
Foresight and its differences from intelligence work for HUN MoD intelligence and 
policy analysts. SAG also may organize a yearly conference on possible areas of 
cooperation between Foresight and intelligence in Hungary. The SAG should invite not 
only experts from the HUN MoD but also people from civilian organizations (companies 
and universities, for example) so that Foresight projects and open-source intelligence 
works can serve as the basis for exchanging experience and knowledge.  
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